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The Rise of BlackRock in Perspective: How Did the $11.5 Trillion Asset Management Giant Emerge?
Original Article Title: "22 Minutes, 6700 Words, In-Depth Insight into the Rise of BlackRock"
Original Source: ManSa Finance
Original Translation: lenaxin, ChainCatcher
BlackRock's capital tentacles have penetrated over 3000 listed companies globally, from Apple and Xiaomi to BYD and Meituan. Its shareholder list covers core areas such as the Internet, new energy, and consumption. As we use food delivery apps or subscribe to funds, this financial giant managing $11.5 trillion in assets is quietly reshaping the modern economic order.
BlackRock's rise began during the 2008 financial crisis. At that time, Bear Stearns faced a liquidity crisis due to 750,000 derivative contracts (ABS, MBS, CDO, etc.), and the Fed urgently commissioned BlackRock to assess and dispose of its toxic assets. Founder Larry Fink, using the Aladdin system (risk analysis algorithm platform), led the liquidation of institutions like Bear Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup, and monitored Fannie Mae's $5 trillion balance sheet. Over the next decade, BlackRock, through acquisitions like Barclays Global Investors and leading the expansion of the ETF market, established a capital network spanning over 100 countries.
To truly understand BlackRock's rise, we need to go back to its founder Larry Fink's early experiences. Fink's story is full of drama, from a genius financial innovator to a failure due to one setback, then rising again to ultimately build BlackRock into this financial giant; his journey is a fascinating financial epic.
From Genius to Failure—Early Experiences of BlackRock Founder Larry Fink
Post-WWII Baby Boom and Real Estate Boom in the United States
"After WWII, a large number of soldiers returned to the US, nearly 80 million babies were born in twenty years, accounting for one-third of the US population. The Baby Boomer generation was enthusiastic about investing in stocks, real estate, and early consumption, leading to the lowest personal savings rate in the US dropping to 0-1% annually."
Fast forward to the 1970s, the post-WWII Baby Boomer generation in the US gradually entered the 25 and older age group, triggering an unprecedented real estate boom. In the initial mortgage market, banks entered a long repayment cycle after making loans. The bank's ability to re-lend was limited by the borrower's repayment status. This simple operating mechanism was far from sufficient to meet the rapidly growing loan demand.
The Invention and Impact of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
Lewis Ranieri, Vice Chairman of the renowned Wall Street investment bank Solomon Brothers, designed a groundbreaking product. He bundled thousands of mortgage debts held by banks together, then divided them into small pieces to sell to investors. This meant that banks could quickly recover funds and use them to issue new loans.
The result was a sharp amplification of the bank's lending capacity, and this product immediately attracted investments from many long-term capital sources such as insurance companies and pension funds, leading to a significant decrease in mortgage rates. At the same time, it addressed the needs of both the funding side and the investment side, which is the so-called MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities). However, MBS was still not sophisticated enough. This was akin to indiscriminately slicing a big cake, evenly distributing the cash flow, which failed to meet investors' differentiated demands.
The Design and Risk of CMOs (Collateralized Mortgage Obligations)
In the 1980s, a more creative rising star emerged from the first Boston investment bank than Ranieri: Larry Fink. If MBS was an undifferentiated evenly sliced big cake, Larry Fink added an extra step. He first cut the big cake into four layers of thin cakes. When repayments occurred, the A-level bond principal was repaid first, followed by the B-level bond principal, then the C-level bond principal. The most imaginative part was the fourth layer, not the D-level bond principal, but the principal of a bond known as the Z-bond. Until the principal of the first three levels of bonds was fully repaid, the Z-bond received no interest, only accumulating unpaid interest.
The interest was added to the principal for compound interest calculation until the principal of the first three levels of bonds was fully settled, only then did the Z-bond start receiving returns. Ranging from A to Z in terms of risk and reward, this product, which segmented repayment schedules step by step to meet the diverse demands of different investors, is known as CMO (Collateralized Mortgage Obligation).
One could say that Ranieri was the one who opened Pandora's Box, and Fink opened a box within that box. At the inception of MBS and CMO, neither Ranieri nor Fink could anticipate how these two products would have such a dramatic impact on world financial history. At the time, the financial industry viewed them merely as genius creations. At the age of 31, Fink became the youngest partner in the world's leading investment bank, First Boston. He led a Jewish team known as the "Little Israel." A business magazine listed him as one of Wall Street's top five young financial leaders. After the launch of CMO, it was well received in the market, generating enormous profits for First Boston. Everyone believed Fink would soon become the head of the company, but it was precisely at the final step of Fink's pinnacle that a collapse occurred.
Black Monday and the $100 Million Painful Lesson
Both MBS and CMO faced a very tricky problem. When interest rates rose significantly, the repayment period extended, locking in investments and missing out on high-interest financial opportunities. When interest rates dropped significantly, a wave of early repayments severed cash flow. Whether interest rates rose sharply or fell significantly, it had a negative impact on investors. This phenomenon of being stuck at both ends is known as negative convexity, and the Z-bond further magnified this negative convexity. A higher duration is highly sensitive to interest rate changes. From 1984 to 1986, the Federal Reserve continued to cut interest rates, reducing rates by 563 basis points over two years, ultimately creating the largest rate drop in forty years. Many borrowers chose to refinance with newer contracts at lower rates, leading to an unprecedented wave of mortgage repayments.
In the CMO issuance, the Fink's team accumulated a large number of unsold Z bonds, turning into a looming volcano ready to erupt. These Z bonds were originally priced at around $150, but after reassessment, they were only valued at $105, with a striking force strong enough to crush the entire mortgage securities department of First Boston Bank.
What's even more unfortunate is that Fink's team had been using short positions on long-term government bonds to hedge risks. However, on October 19, 1987, the world witnessed the infamous Black Monday -- a stock market crash where the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted by 22.6% in a single day. A massive influx of investors rushed into the government bond market for safe haven, causing bond prices to skyrocket by 10 points in a day. Under this double blow, First Boston ended up losing $100 million. The media once praised, "Only the sky is Larry Fink's limit." And now, Larry Fink's sky has collapsed. His colleagues no longer speak to him, and the company bars him from any critical business involvement. Through this subtle form of ostracism, Fink eventually chose to resign.
The Rise and Fall of Larry Fink at First Boston
Fink was accustomed to living in the limelight and understood Wall Street's preference for success far outweighing humility. The unforgettable humiliation this time made him deeply regretful. In fact, one of the reasons Fink worked so hard to issue CMOs was to make First Boston the premier institution in the mortgage bond market, a position he had to fight for against Lannely, representing Solomon Brothers.
When Fink first graduated from UCLA, he went to interview at Goldman Sachs. After being rejected in the final round of interviews, it was First Boston that accepted him when he was desperate for an opportunity. It was also at First Boston that he learned Wall Street's harshest lesson. Almost all media reports later simplistically concluded, "Fink failed due to an incorrect bet on interest rate hikes." However, a witness who had worked with Fink at First Boston pointed out the key issue. Although Fink's team had also established a risk management system back then, calculating risk with the computing power of the 80s was like using an abacus to process big data.
The Birth of the Aladdin System and the Rise of BlackRock
The Establishment of BlackRock
In 1988, just a few days after leaving First Boston, Fink organized an elite group to discuss his new venture at his home. His goal was to build an unprecedentedly powerful risk management system because he would never allow himself to fall into an unassessable risk situation again.
In this elite group handpicked by Fink were four of his former colleagues from First Boston. Robert Kapito had always been Fink's loyal comrade; Barbara Novick was a strong-minded portfolio manager; Bennett Grubb was a mathematical prodigy; Chris Anderson was a top securities analyst. Additionally, Fink poached his good friend from Lehman, Ralph Sosstern, who had been a domestic policy advisor to President Carter, and Sosstern brought in Susan Wade, the former vice president of Lehman's mortgage department. Finally, Hugh Frater, the executive vice president of Pittsburgh National Bank, joined. These eight individuals were later recognized as BlackRock's eight co-founders.
At that time, what they needed most was seed funding, and Fink reached out to Stephen Schwarzman of Blackstone Group. Blackstone was a private equity firm founded by former US Secretary of Commerce (and former Lehman CEO) Peter Peterson, along with his then-partner Stephen Schwarzman. In 1988, during the heyday of corporate mergers and acquisitions, Blackstone's main business was leveraged buyouts, but opportunities for such buyouts were not always available. So Blackstone was also looking to diversify, and Schwarzman was very interested in Fink's team. However, Fink's $100 million loss in the First Boston incident was well known. Schwarzman had to call his friend, Bruce Wasserstein, the head of First Boston's M&A business, for advice. Wasserstein told Schwarzman, "Larry Fink is still the most talented person on Wall Street today."
Schwarzman immediately issued a $5 million line of credit and $150,000 in seed funding for Fink, and thus, a department named Blackstone Financial Management Group was established under Blackstone's umbrella. Fink's team and Blackstone each held a 50% stake. Initially, they didn't even have a separate workplace and had to rent a small space in Bear Stearns' trading floor. Nevertheless, things developed far beyond expectations, and Fink's team repaid all the borrowed funds shortly after opening. Within a year, they had expanded the fund management scale to $2.7 billion.
Development of the Aladdin System
The key reason for their rapid rise was a computer system they developed, later named the "Asset, Liability, Debt & Derivative Investment Network" with the acronym Aladdin, a metaphor for the mythical image of Aladdin's lamp from "One Thousand and One Nights," implying that the system could provide investors with insightful wisdom like a magic lamp.
The first version was coded on a $20,000 workstation placed between the office fridge and coffee machine. This system, which used modern technology for risk management and computational models based on vast information to replace traders' experiential judgments, undoubtedly advanced with the times. The success of Fink's team was like hitting the jackpot for Blackstone's Schwarzman. However, their equity relationship began to deteriorate.
Parting Ways with Blackstone Group
Due to rapid business expansion, Fink recruited more talent and insisted on granting stock options to new employees. This led to a rapid dilution of Blackstone's stake from 50% to 35%. Schwarzman told Fink that Blackstone could not endlessly transfer shares. Eventually, in 1994, Blackstone sold its stake to Pittsburgh National Bank for $240 million, with Schwarzman personally pocketing $25 million, coinciding with his divorce from his wife, Ellen, at that time.
Business Weekly jokingly remarked: "Su Shimin's profits are just enough to cover Alan's divorce settlement," Many years later, Su Shimin recalled his split with Fink and admitted that he didn't think he made $25 million but lost $4 billion. In reality, he had no choice. In fact, looking back at the whole situation, one would find that Fink diluting Blackstone's holdings seemed more intentional.
Origin of the Name BlackRock
After the Fink team separated from Blackstone, they needed a new name. Su Shimin asked Fink to avoid the words "black" and "stone." However, Fink proposed a slightly humorous idea to Su Shimin, saying, "J.P. Morgan's split from Morgan Stanley is complementary in development, so he is ready to use the name 'BlackRock' to pay tribute to Blackstone." Su Shimin agreed to this request in jest, and that's how BlackRock got its name.
Subsequently, BlackRock's assets under management gradually rose to $165 billion in the late 1990s. Their asset risk control system became increasingly relied upon by many financial giants.
BlackRock's Rapid Expansion and Technological Edge
In 1999, BlackRock went public on the NYSE, and the surge in financing capabilities enabled BlackRock to rapidly expand its scale through direct acquisitions. This marked the transformation from a regional asset management company to a global giant.
In 2006, a significant event occurred on Wall Street. Merrill Lynch's CEO, Stanley O'Neal, decided to sell Merrill Lynch's vast asset management division. Larry Fink immediately recognized this as a golden opportunity and invited O'Neal to have breakfast at an Upper East Side restaurant. After just 15 minutes of conversation, they outlined the merger deal on a menu. Through an equity swap, BlackRock merged with Merrill Lynch Asset Management, and the new company continued under the name BlackRock, instantly skyrocketing its assets under management to nearly $1 trillion.
One key reason for BlackRock's incredible rapid rise in the first 20 years was that they addressed the issue of information asymmetry between investment buyers and sellers. In traditional investment trading, the buyer’s information primarily came from the seller's marketing. Those in the seller's camp, such as investment bankers, analysts, and traders, monopolized core capabilities like asset pricing. This was akin to buying groceries at a market where we could never know more about vegetables than the sellers. BlackRock used the Aladdin system to manage customer investments, allowing you to make a more professional judgment about the quality and price of a cabbage than the seller.
Savior in the Financial Crisis
BlackRock's Key Role in the 2008 Financial Crisis
In the spring of 2008, the United States was in the most perilous moment of the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The nation's fifth-largest investment bank, Bear Stearns, was on the brink and filed for bankruptcy in federal court. Bear Stearns' transactions were global, and if it collapsed, it was highly likely to trigger a systemic meltdown.
The Federal Reserve held an emergency meeting and, at 9 a.m. on that day, devised an unprecedented plan, authorizing the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide a $300 billion special loan to facilitate the direct acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase.
JPMorgan Chase proposed a $2 per share acquisition offer, which almost caused a rebellion among Bear Stearns' board members on the spot. It's worth noting that Bear Stearns' stock price reached $159 in 2007. The $2 price was considered an insult to this 85-year-old prestigious firm, and JPMorgan Chase had their own concerns. It was said that Bear Stearns still held a significant amount of "illiquid mortgage-related assets." The term "illiquid mortgage-related assets" was seen as a bomb by JPMorgan Chase.
All parties involved quickly realized that this acquisition and its complexities raised two pressing issues that needed to be addressed. The first was the valuation issue, and the second was the toxic asset separation issue. Everyone on Wall Street knew who to turn to. New York Fed President Geithner reached out to Larry Fink, who, upon receiving approval from the New York Fed, had BlackRock move in to carry out a comprehensive liquidation at Bear Stearns.
Twenty years ago, they had offices here, renting space in Bear Stearns' trading floor. As the story unfolds, you will find it quite dramatic. You see, Larry Fink, who took center stage as the firefighting captain, was an absolute godfather figure in the mortgage-backed securities industry, and he himself was one of the key instigators of the subprime crisis.
With BlackRock's assistance, JPMorgan Chase completed the acquisition of Bear Stearns at a price of approximately $10 per share, marking the demise of the once-famous Bear Stearns. Meanwhile, the name BlackRock became even more prominent. The three major U.S. rating agencies, S&P, Moody's, and Fitch, had granted AAA ratings to over 90% of the subprime mortgage-backed securities, tarnishing their reputation during the subprime crisis. It could be said that the entire U.S. financial market valuation system collapsed, and BlackRock, with its robust analytical system, became an irreplaceable executor in the U.S. market bailout plan.
Bear Stearns, AIG, and the Fed's Market Bailout
In September 2008, the Federal Reserve embarked on another, even more dire, bailout plan. The largest U.S. insurance company, American International Group (AIG), had seen its stock price drop by 79% in the first three quarters, primarily due to its $527 billion worth of credit default swaps on the brink of collapse. A credit default swap, abbreviated as CDS, is essentially an insurance policy where the CDS would pay out in case of a bond default, even if the purchaser of the CDS does not hold the bond contract. This scenario is akin to a large group of people without cars purchasing unlimited auto insurance. If a $100,000 car encounters a problem, the insurance company may have to pay out $1 million.
CDS has been turned into a gambling tool by these market speculators. At that time, the scale of subprime mortgage bonds was about $7 trillion, but the CDSs guaranteeing these bonds amounted to several tens of trillions. At that time, the annual GDP of the United States was only around $13 trillion. The Federal Reserve quickly realized that if Bear Stearns' problem was a bomb, then AIG's problem was a nuclear bomb.
The Federal Reserve had to authorize $85 billion to urgently bailout AIG by acquiring a 79% equity stake. In a sense, AIG was turned into a state-owned enterprise, and BlackRock once again received special authorization to perform a comprehensive valuation and liquidation of AIG, becoming the Fed's operational director.
Through the efforts of many parties, the crisis was eventually contained. During the subprime crisis, BlackRock was also authorized by the Federal Reserve to assist Citigroup and oversee the $5 trillion balance sheet of the two GSEs. Larry Fink was recognized as the new king of Wall Street, establishing a close relationship with U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson and New York Fed President Geithner.
Geithner later succeeded Paulson as the new Treasury Secretary, while Larry Fink was jokingly referred to as the U.S. underground Treasury Secretary. BlackRock transitioned from a relatively pure financial company to a hybrid of politics and business.
The Birth of a Global Capital Giant
Acquisition of Barclays Global Investors and Dominance in the ETF Market
In 2009, BlackRock once again encountered a major opportunity. The UK's renowned investment bank Barclays Group ran into operational difficulties and reached an agreement with the private equity firm CVC to sell its iShares fund business. The deal was already done, but it included a 45-day bidding clause. BlackRock lobbied Barclays, saying, "Instead of selling iShares separately, it is better to merge all of Barclays Group's asset business with BlackRock as a whole."
Finally, BlackRock acquired Barclays Global Investors for $13.5 billion. This transaction was considered the most strategically significant acquisition in BlackRock's development history, as iShares under Barclays Global Investors was the world's largest exchange-traded open-end index fund issuer at the time.
Exchange-traded open-end index funds have a more concise term: ETF (Exchange-Traded Fund). Since the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the concept of passive investment has rapidly gained popularity, and the global ETF scale gradually exceeded $15 trillion, with iShares now under BlackRock's wing. This allowed BlackRock to temporarily hold a 40% share of the U.S. ETF market, and the massive fund size required broad asset allocation for risk diversification.
On one hand, there is active investment, while on the other hand, there is passive tracking through ETFs, index funds, and other products that need to hold all or most of the stock equity in sectors or index component companies. Therefore, BlackRock holds stakes in a wide range of large publicly traded companies globally, with their clients mostly being pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other large institutions.
BlackRock's Influence in Corporate Governance
Although in theory BlackRock simply manages assets on behalf of clients, it wields significant influence in practice. For example, in Microsoft and Apple shareholder meetings, BlackRock has repeatedly exercised its voting rights and participated in key decision-making. When looking at the statistics of large U.S. publicly listed companies, which represent 90% of the total market capitalization, you will find that BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, the three giants, are either the largest or second-largest shareholders in these companies. The combined market value of these companies is around $45 trillion, far exceeding the U.S. GDP.
This high concentration of ownership is unprecedented in global economic history. Furthermore, asset management companies like Vanguard also lease BlackRock's Aladdin system. Therefore, the assets managed in the Aladdin system exceed BlackRock's managed assets by over $10 trillion.
Guardian of the Capital Order
In 2020, during another market crisis, the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet by $3 trillion to stabilize the market. BlackRock once again acted as the Fed's appointed steward, taking over the corporate bond purchase program. Several BlackRock executives resigned and moved on to roles in the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Conversely, former U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials have taken up positions at BlackRock after leaving public office. This frequent two-way movement of personnel, known as the "revolving door," has sparked intense public scrutiny. A BlackRock employee once commented, "Although I don't like Larry Fink, if he were to leave BlackRock, it would be like Ferguson leaving Manchester United." Today, BlackRock's assets under management have surpassed $115 trillion. Larry Fink's navigation between government and business terrifies Wall Street, and this dual-color image confirms his profound understanding of the industry.
The true financial power lies not in the trading halls but in grasping the essence of risk. When technology, capital, and power converge in a triad, BlackRock has evolved from an asset manager to a guardian of the capital order.
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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk
Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:
To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:
Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:
(I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.
The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.
A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.
（II）Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.
Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.
(III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.
(IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.
(5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.
(6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.
(7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.
(8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.
（IX） Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.
（X） Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.
（XI） Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.
（XII） Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.
（XIII） Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.
（XIV） Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.
(15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.
(16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.
(17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.
(18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.
(19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.
This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.
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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk
Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:
To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:
Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:
(I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.
The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.
A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.
（II）Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.
Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.
(III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.
(IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.
(5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.
(6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.
(7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.
(8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.
（IX） Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.
（X） Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.
（XI） Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.
（XII） Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.
（XIII） Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.
（XIV） Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.
(15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.
(16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.
(17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.
(18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.
(19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.
This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.
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